The Israel-Palestine Question

Since the early years of the 20^th Century, the Middle East has seen many efforts at a lasting peace amidst countless wars and acts of violence. The fulcrum upon which the stability of the region rests is Israel and its relationship with not only its neighbors, but also elements within its own population. Even before Israel declared its status as an independent nation in 1948, Arabs and Jews had become accustomed to view each other as enemies. The Jews, having been a people in exile for over a thousand years, returned suddenly to a part of the world where they were no longer welcome. The heart of the matter concerns a land that is holy to both Jew and Muslim; a land that neither side seems willing to give up, or even to share peacefully. After over a century of diplomacy, little progress has been made as every step seems to herald another step back. The best diplomatic minds of the 20^th century failed so miserably by a combination of misunderstanding, self-interest, and general naivety.

As the First World War still raged in Europe, popular thought among Zionists was that by backing the victors, they would get the greatest help in founding their nation. According to the Congressional Quarterly publication, The Middle East, at the same time, the British thought that by backing Zionist claims for a homeland in the Middle East, their own empire would be strengthened _{(Congressional Quarterly 15)}. Ironically, as reported by Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajkar in their essay, "Israel and Palestine from World War II Through Camp David I", many Arab nations also sided with the allies because of their support of Arab autonomy in the area _{(Beinin 29-30)}. This is indicative of the general consensus that both the Balfour Declaration and subsequent White Papers were attempts to appease all the parties concerned without promising anything specific to either group. Indeed, throughout, the allies perpetuated the impression to the Jews that they would get their homeland, while giving the Arabs the impression that they would be getting their own independent state. Obviously, pleasing groups with conflicting agendas is a futile task and it should not have been surprising that as Jewish immigration was encouraged and increased, Arab resentment also increased _{(CQ 32)}.

In return for his wartime development of synthetic cordite for the British government,writes journalist Raymond Carroll, Chaim Weizmann, a well known British chemist and ardent Zionist, asked the British government to support the Zionist movement. Because many strategists thought that a strong Jewish state with close ties to Britain would help to secure the Suez Canal area, this was not a difficult proposal to back. The result was Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour's declaration . Popular support was guaranteed because of a population who, having been brought up with the Bible stories, identified closely with Judaism _{(Carroll 30)}. However, the declaration itself was vague and did not promise anything tangible to either side: There was no mention of a Jewish state, only that the Jews should have “a home in Palestine” _{(Beinin 33)}. Furthermore, not only were the Arabs not consulted, but the promises of autonomy were destroyed when it became clear that Britain and France had colluded to split up the crumbling Ottoman Empire into their own spheres of interest ₍₃₁₎.

The vagueness of the Balfour Declaration translated into weak policy. In their book, The Palestine-Israeli Conflict, Rabbi Professor Dan Cohn-Sherbok, and Professor Dawoud El-Alami, Professors of Judaism and Islamic Studies at the University of Wales, contend that because the Jewish population was only about 11% of the total at the time, truly representative authorities were difficult to establish. The result was that the Jews and Palestinians set up their own institutions that did not answer to the British authorities _{(Cohn-Sherbok 26)}. If an Arab/Jewish legislative body had been set up, a peaceful coexistence would have been possible ₍₁₇₇₎. As reported by Jocelyn Grange in the introduction to Israel/Palestine: The Black Book, even the author of the 1917 declaration, Arthur Balfour, admitted several years later that Britain had not accounted for the needs of an existing population, rather they tried to “recreate a new and permanent majority community there” _(Grange).

After three years of rioting and two White Papers stating that the Balfour Declaration was not suggesting Jewish statehood in Palestine, the 1939 White Paper was issued, which recommended the ending of the British mandate in Palestine in favor of an independent state governed by Jews and Palestinians. The main impetus here was concern within the British government that the Arabs may otherwise look towards Germany for support. Negotiations went a long way towards Arab demands whilst doing nothing for the Zionist side of the equation. For example, Jewish immigration was restricted, and their land purchases were restricted to areas near the coast. Arabs still opposed the measures due to their not being willing to accept any Jewish immigration, and still demanding full independence. On the other hand, the Jews found it unacceptable that their homeland was not to be totally Jewish. It can be seen that both Arab and Jewish trust of Britain was declining and indeed, the Jews even began to reach out to other nations, most notably the USA, for support _{(CQ 21)}. Attempts by Britain to keep both sides happy only succeeded to make both sides bitter and more divided.

After 5 years of war, culminating in 1945, the British economy was a shadow of its former self, and was in debt to the same Arab nations who provided her oil, writes John R. Gee in his essay, "The Palestinian Resistance Movement and the First Intifada". Patently, such a country could no longer maintain its presence in Palestine so the matter was turned over to the newly created United Nations _{(Gee 41-42)}. After all, Britain had only managed to encourage, then discourage Jewish immigration; one day appease the Arabs and the next the Jews. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was set up to examine the problem and, in 1947, UN resolution 181 was passed. This not only recommended termination of the British mandate in Palestine, but also partitioning into two states with Jerusalem under UN administration. Because this seemed to give credence to a Jewish state, and gave the minority Jews 55% of the territory _{(CQ 44-45)}, Arab violence erupted and, on Britain's eventual exit, the armies of several neighboring Arab states marched in to start the 1948 war ₍₂₆₎. According to an article, “Israel's Independence Role of the UN: What was the role of the United Nations?”, published by a seemingly pro-Israeli website _{(palestinefacts)}, this resolution is often cited by the Palestinians when it is advantageous to their side, despite the fact that they rejected it in 1947. Indeed, as late as 1999, resolution 181 was used as the basis for a call by the Palestinian Authority for another resolution giving them self-determination _{(palestinefacts)}.

Another major UN effort, Resolution 242 was laid out after the 1967 war Israel waged against Egypt and Syria. The two main points were that Israel should withdraw from the land gained during the war and that all nations should recognize, and not instigate aggression toward each other. The main weakness, however was in the wording: English and French both being official languages of the UN, the translations differed slightly. Israel liked to refer to the English translation which required them to withdraw from “territories” rather than the French which said they needed to withdraw from “the territories.” This time the Palestinians were not happy because they were not given the right of self-determination, while still being required to recognize Israel's existence. Opposition, however, was not harmonious among the Arab nations as they all had their own interests at stake: Egypt, for example, wanted Israeli withdrawal as a precondition for negotiations; Syria would, rather than focus on the resolution, support Palestinian resistance groups. King Hussein of Jordan accepted the resolution but tolerated resistance groups that operated from his country _{(Beinin 34)}. The resistance groups were an indication that there was disunity even among Palestinians, many of whom felt that their destiny was in their own hands and they needed to take what was rightfully theirs by force of arms.

After Egypt's President Nasser died in 1970, the less hard line Anwar Sadat took over. Attempts by the USA to include Sadat in negotiations aimed at a revival of resolution 242 were bound to failure simply because the Palestinians would not accept Sadat as their Representative and, similarly, Israel wanted no intermediary, but to be a party to their own negotiations _{(CQ 40)}. Extreme elements of both Israel and the PLO were angry at their leaders who came to an agreement to set up a “Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority.” According to Ljubomir Radovanovic in his article “Reflections on the November 22, 1967 Security Council Resolution”, 242 was a failure for several fundamental reasons: The Arab nations never accepted partition or recognized Israel; The Arab state of Palestine was never established, instead the land was divided; Jerusalem never got international status; and in 1973, yet another war broke out _{(Radovanovic)}.

Being convinced that the United States was key to lasting peace, Sadat reached out to President Jimmy Carter who invited him and Israeli President Begin to Camp David for negotiations _{(Carroll 78-79)}. The resulting 1978 agreement known as the Camp David Accords stressed that it was necessary for there to be negotiations concerning Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ₍₈₂₎. Again, while hard line elements within Begin's government could not accept the agreement, hard line Arabs felt that Sadat had betrayed the Palestinian cause and he, like Rabin years later, fell to an assassins bullet _(78-79). On the positive side, the accords set a foundation for a 1979 treaty between Israel and Egypt as well as a direction for the future of the occupied territories _{(CQ 50)}. There were some big weaknesses in the accords: Firstly, that the Palestinians rejected the part proposing their autonomy because it did not guarantee full Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in the 1967 war, nor did it establish a Palestinian state. After the accords, Israel violated Begin's agreement at Camp David by continuing to take Palestinian land and building Jewish settlements _{(Beinin 34-35)}. The one bright point, according to Ivor Lucas in his article, “1979: Year of Destiny in the Middle East”, was that Sadat's actions, which at first angered most Arabs, eventually led to many of them realizing that coming to some kind of agreement with Israel was inevitable _(Lucas).

Today, the fundamental issues remain the same: While the Palestinian authorities, first the PLO and now Hamas, are committed to destroying Israel, Israel refuse to negotiate with an entity that will not recognize their existence. The United Nations remains as weak as it always has been in that it has very limited authority to back any resolution, and Arab/Palestinian opinion is assumed to be universal rather than fragmented. Such assumptions have always proved naive and unrealistic. Whether or not there will ever be a lasting peace and homes for all the people in the Middle East, only time will tell.

Beinin, Joel. and Lisa Hajjar. "Israel and Palestine from World War II Through Camp David I." The Palestinians and the Disputed Territories. Ed. Neil Alger. Farmington Hill MI: Thomson Gale, 2004, 29-35.

Carroll, Raymond. The Palestine Question. New York: Impact, 1983.

Cohn-Sherbok, Dan. and Dawoud El-Alami. The Palestine-Israeli Conflict. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001.

Congressional Quarterly. The Middle East. Washington: CQ press, 2000.

Gee, John R. "The Palestinian Resistance Movement and the First Intifada." The Palestinians and the Disputed Territories. Ed. Neil Alger. Farmington Hill MI: Thomson Gale, 2004, 36-45.

Grange, Jocelyn. Introduction. Israel/Palestine: The Black Book. London: Plutobooks, 2002. 1-8.

Huneidi, Sahar. “Was Balfour Policy Reversible? The Colonial Office and Palestine, 1921-23.” Journal of Palestine Studies. 27 (Winter 1998) 23-41.

“Israel's Independence Role of the UN.” Palestine Facts. 2006. 11 Apr. 2006. <http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_independence_un_role.php>

Lucas, Ivor. "1979: Year of Destiny in the Middle East."

Radovanovic, Ljubomir. “Reflections on the November 22, 1967 Security Council Resolution.” Journal of Palestine Studies. 1 (Winter 1972) 61-69.