Islam: The Shia-Sunni divide

Islam is one of the world’s major religions and; as reported by “Inside Islam”, a History Channel Broadcast; with about 95% of the world’s Muslim population, the Shia and Sunni sects wield considerable influence in world affairs. Despite having more in common than they have differences, acrimony between them is one of the major obstacles for the hopes of long term peace in the Middle East. According to a March 2006 article in The Economist, the two sects have lived and thrived in the same part of the world for centuries _{(“Does it have to be war?”)}. Indeed, both Shias and Sunnis worship the same God, revere the same holy book, and share many practices. So why there is such fierce dislike between many of these adherents is a question that is of enormous significance for the whole World.

            The rift began following the death of the great prophet Mohammed. While the majority of followers took it for granted that the successor should be decided by the community leaders, there was a minority who believed the successor should begin with Mohammed’s son, Ali, and continue in a hereditary fashion. According to Max Gross in the Congressional Quarterly’s publication, The Middle East , the former of these groups evolved into what we now call the Sunni Muslims and the latter became the Shia _{(Gross 200)}. Of course, it was the majority who won over and it was actually Mohammed’s father-in-law, Abu Bakr, who became what was known as the first Caliph. Despite Ali’s eventually becoming the fourth Caliph, this didn’t last long as, throughout history, it has always been the Sunni Muslims who enjoyed the traditional seats of power. On the other hand it has always been the Shia who have been the disadvantaged and, as such, the more militant of the two.

            The first revolt occurred in the year 655 after Ali had become the fourth Caliph when a larger force led by Aisha, the daughter of Abu Bakr and widow of Mohammed, was defeated by Ali’s army in what became known as the “Battle of the Camel” ₍₂₀₉₎. The first actual war occurred as a result of the Syrian governor, Mu’awiya Ibn Abi Sufyan, refusing to recognize Ali’s caliphate. Although the battle was a stalemate, the settlement went against Ali and started the rule of the Umayyad caliphs ₍₂₀₁₎. The major division we know of today is attributed to a series of civil wars that occurred during the reign of Yazid, son of Muawiyah. One revolt led by Ali’s son, Husayn, resulted in his entire army being destroyed with him at Karbala in modern day Iraq. According to John Esposito in his book Islam: The Straight Path , it is this event that Shias consider martyrdom and still provides them with the historical context for their inspiration and guidance _{(Esposito 43)}. To this day, Shias celebrate the martyrdom at Karbala, holding ritual reenactments including plays, processions, and mourning. From this they gain their character of the oppressed, and inspiration to continue the struggle to restore God’s rule over the world ₍₁₁₁₎.

            Strong Shia backing led to the toppling of the Umayyad rulers in 750 and their replacement with a new ruling class called the Abbasids. First claiming they followed the idea of a hereditary Imam, the Abbasid dynasty quickly went back on their word and went about destroying the very people who had supported their drive for power. This further embittered the Shia and alienated them even more from the mainstream of Islam ₍₅₁₎.

            Doctrinally, the obvious difference between the two sects is the Shia Imamate as opposed to the Sunni Caliphate, the latter being selected and is answerable to the political and military leadership rather than to the authority stemming from Mohammed’s line of succession. To the contrary, the Shia Imamate is divinely inspired and infallible as God’s appointed representative on Earth. He must be in direct line of succession from Mohammed and, like his ancestor, acts as both political leader and spiritual guide ₍₄₃₎. Both Shia and Sunni views of history perpetuate their positions of disadvantaged underdog and ruling class respectively. For the Sunnis, their early successes are a vindication of their righteousness and that God’s favor is bestowed upon them. For the Shia, they view history as a long struggle to restore Islam united under an Imam who acts as an intermediary to God ₍₄₃₎. Rather than use intermediaries, the Sunnis believe that they have a direct and personal relationship with God ₍₁₀₉₎. Stemming from this come the basic differences in legal code: The Sunnis accept the consensus as a legal source whereas the Shia accept only the divine authority of the Imam as supreme authority ₍₈₅₎.

            Sunni Islam has four general schools of thought that are not recognized by the Shias: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali with the first of these being the most prevalent and official. The emphasis here is on “reason and independent legal opinion in the development of Islamic doctrine and law.” _{(Gross 208-9)}. The oldest school, mostly isolated to North and West Africa, is the Maliki witch emphasizes the sayings and actions of Mohammed _{(Hadith and Sunnah)}. The shafi’i is considered the most legally rigorous and is most influential in Egypt, Yeman, East Africa, and South East Asia. The Hanbali, mostly isolated to Saudi Arabia and Quatar is the most conservative of the four and rejects all but the Qur’an, emphasizing the imitation of Arabian life in Mohammed’s time _(208-9).

            While rejecting the Sunni versions, the Shiites have their own school of thought called Ja’afari which is concerned with the traditions of Mohammed’s attempted and alleged appointment of Ali as his successor ₍₂₀₉₎. Also important to the Shiites are certain symbols and practices that are only very superficial to the Sunnis. These refer to the Fourteen Pure or Perfect Ones who are, The prophet Mohammed; Ali, Fatima, and their sons Hasan and Husayn; and the remaining 9 Imams. The Shia celebrate various birthdays, death days and other important dates related to these individuals _{(Esposito 110)}.

            Although Shia is the second largest faction within Islam, it still makes up only about 10% of the world’s Muslims with around 85% being Sunni. However, this branch has been the official form of Islam in Iran since the Safamid Empire established it in ancient Persia, and about 93% of Iran’s population now adheres to this version. Iran’s neighbor to the West, Iraq, also has a majority Shiite population although more balanced, with about 55% compared to to 45% Sunni. It is not surprising, therefore, that Iran and Iraq have been enemies in more recent years. Not so much due to doctrinal differences, but because of Iraq’s fear since the 1979 Islamic revolution that a resurgence in Shia Islam would spill over into Iraq and upset the minority ruling Sunni class. Indeed, this is the main reason for the Iran-Iraq war which killed about a million people between 1980 and 1988. Like many wars, it appears this one was pointless: According to Dr. Mohammed Alwan, a Shia Muslim from Iraq, the Shias of Iraq are not concerned with joining any general uprising against the Sunnis, but more with improving their own wellbeing under the Sunni leadership _(60-2).

            Another significant manifestation of the rift between Sunni and Shia Islam, according to an article by Tim McGirk, was the trouble between Iran and its Northern neighbor, Afghanistan, which was then ruled with an iron fist by the Taliban who follow an extreme form of Sunni Islam. This time it was Iran who feared that the Taliban would spread their version of Islam over the border _(McGirk). Today, the biggest threat to peace in not only the Middle East, but also to the world, is the situation in Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s Sunni regime. Since they lost their grip on power, the Sunnis have accused the Shiites of collaborating with the Western occupying forces. The result is that it is the Sunni factions who have now become the more militant, bombing Shiite mosques and holy sites as well as murdering Shiite civilians. Certainly, these events never go unanswered as groups of armed Shiites hunt down individual Sunnis who are believed to have committed atrocities against them _{(“Does it have to be war?)}

            Because of the great unrest in Iraq, other parts of the Middle East have been under great tension. Iran’s ambition to become a nuclear power is a frightening prospect to many Sunnis across the world who see these events as empowering the Shiite minority and upsetting the status quo _{(“Does it have to be war?)}. Interestingly, the increased power enjoyed by the Shiites has meant they no longer need to be so militant and, according to an article by Vali Nasr, it is the Sunnis who have begun to turn to a more activist strategy. The question remains, however, whether the Shiites are united enough to mount a real challenge to Sunni supremacy as they have always had their own internal struggles _(Nasr). Of vital importance to peace in the region is that the Western powers who mediate and the international organizations assisting in delivering aid understand the fundamental and underlying reasons for all the troubles. Practically all the violence and unrest is based on political rather than doctrinal motives; who has power and who is the ruled _{(“Does it have to be war?)}. None want to be ruled but want to be in control of their own destiny. Until all parties are convinced that the West does not favor one of these groups over another, that power will be shared equally, and that people will enjoy the freedom they deserve will peace reign in the Middle East.

“Does it have to be war? – Sunnis and Shias.” The Economist 4 Mar. 2006.

Esposito, John L. Islam: The Straight Path. New York. Oxford UP. 2005.

Gross, Max. “Fourteen Centuries of Islam.” The Middle East. 9^th Edition.             Congressional Quarterly. 2000.

Inside Islam. Dir. Mark Hufnail. The History Channel. 11 Sept. 2002.

McGirk, Tim. “On the Iran-Afghan Border, a Fundamentalist Face-off.” Time     International. 28 Sep. 1998.

Nasr, Vali. “Regional of Shi’a Revival in Iraq. Washington Quarterly. 27 (2004):             7-24.